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According to the standard thesis of deparliamentarisation outlined in the introductory 
chapter of this volume, national parliaments have been the ‘victims’ or ‘losers’ of 
European integration. National governments, and not backbench parliamentarians, 
represent the member states at the European Union (EU) level, and hence the latter are 
always disadvantaged vis-à-vis the executive branch. Information is the key factor in 
these arguments, as the national MPs can practically never have the same level of policy 
expertise about the issues as representatives of the government. The existing literature 
has thus painted a fairly bleak picture of the impact of EU on domestic legislatures. 
 
While not exactly disconfirming the deparliamentarisation thesis, the contributions 
included in this volume certainly force us to reconsider or moderate such arguments 
about the empowerment of the executive at the expense of parliaments. National 
parliaments clearly have become more active in European affairs, and subject their 
governments to tighter scrutiny in EU issues than previously. This finding is not very 
surprising. After all, the process of European integration has taken major steps or leaps 
forward since the early 1990s, and hence the EU has simply become a much more 
powerful actor whose policy competence extends now to basically all policy sectors. At 
the same time the EU has become much more politicized, with integration matters 
occupying a more central role in domestic political discourses. Hence national MPs and 
their political parties need to pay more attention to politics at the European level. 
 
In parallel with these domestic developments, the volume also shows that there is also 
increasing consensus and constitutional regulation about the collective role of national 
legislatures. The 1990s and first years of the new millennium saw the establishment and 
consolidation of interparliamentary cooperation, and a number of initiatives about how to 
further strengthen the presence of national parliaments in the EU’s policy process. 
However, this phase is now basically over, and hence we have a better understanding of 
the opportunities and limits facing interparliamentary activities.      
        
This concluding chapter discusses the theoretical and practical significance of these main 
findings. The next section examines the implications of tighter domestic scrutiny of 
national governments, arguing that the importance of the EU for national MPs should 
nevertheless not be exaggerated. Towards the end of that section we shift our attention to 
the European level, discussing the benefits and disadvantages of various forms of 
interparliamentary cooperation. In the final section we then map out some major 
challenges for research on national parliaments in Europe, focusing on the increasing use 
of the Open Method of Coordination (OMC) and the interdependence between national 
and European policy agendas, and stressing the need to move beyond studies that 
examine the organizational arrangements and legal norms of parliamentary scrutiny of 
EU matters.            
 Institutional convergence and tighter scrutiny   
 
The contributions in this volume clearly testify that national parliaments are investing 
more resources in European matters than before. This gradual fight back has not taken 
place overnight, but the early 1990s and the signing of the Maastricht Treaty can clearly 
be seen as a turning point. Since then the parliaments process more EU documents, the 
powers and functions of the European Affairs Committees (EAC) have been upgraded, 
and in general national MPs subject the government ministers to tighter scrutiny in 
European affairs. The findings in this volume thus corroborate the pattern that was clearly 
visible already in previous publications – as the EU becomes more important through 
deeper European integration, domestic legislatures pay more attention to what goes on in 
the EU institutions.1
 
The chapter by Conlan showed that the Irish parliament, which until then had adopted a 
rather passive approach towards European integration, redesigned its scrutiny system in 
the first years of the 21st century. However, it is still too early to draw any definitive 
conclusions about the capacity of the Oireachtas to influence governmental EU policy, 
and much depends on the political will of the Irish deputies to use the new legal 
instruments at their disposal. In his analysis of the parliaments of the four Mediterranean 
EU countries, usually categorized as laggards in terms of their engagement in European 
affairs, Magone examines how the Italian and Portuguese legislatures have since the mid-
1990s invested considerably more resources in EU matters. The Spanish and Greek 
parliaments remain, however, very weak vis-à-vis their governments in European 
matters, with MPs in these two countries in general showing relatively little interest in 
such questions. The other chapters on the ‘old’ member states illustrate similar 
developments. Hegeland shows that particularly the Danish and Swedish legislatures 
have evaluated the effectiveness of their scrutiny systems, and both the Swedish Riksdag 
and the Danish Folketing are attempting to make specialized committees more involved 
in the processing of EU issues. From the analysis by Sprungk of the German and French 
scrutiny models, we can see that especially the French parliament has also introduced 
constitutional and procedural changes that improve its capacity to control the government 
in EU issues. Finally, as Cygan shows, in the UK both houses of the parliament have 
consistently reviewed the existing scrutiny mechanisms. 
 
The chapters on the ‘new’ member states prove that the countries which joined the EU in 
2004 have already from the start of their respective membership implemented fairly 
comprehensive scrutiny mechanisms.2 Here the parliaments benefited from their pre-
accession involvement in interparliamentary cooperation and from studying the scrutiny 
systems in place in the old member states. Vehar discusses how the Slovene parliament 
basically by and large copied the Finnish model, while Gyori and Lazowski in their 
chapters also indicate that the Hungarian and Polish legislatures knew the benefits and 
weaknesses of the existing scrutiny systems. Particularly noteworthy in these new 
member states is the role accorded to specialized committees, which seems to be on 
average stronger than in the old member states. However, at the same time the country 
chapters on Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia clearly show that the engagement of the 
sector-specific committees is yet to become institutionalized. Moreover, the new member 
states are still undergoing a period of adjustment, and hence it is probable that the 
scrutiny systems will become more effective once the national MPs are more familiar 
with the rhythm and rules of the EU’s policy process. This also implies that the Bulgarian 
parliament, which according to Stoykova has during membership negotiations been 
effectively sidelined, is likely to redesign its scrutiny system either on the eve of 
accession to the EU or shortly after Bulgaria has joined the Union.        
 
When designing new scrutiny systems (new member states), or choosing how to 
strengthen existing mechanisms of control (old member countries), the national MPs and 
parliamentary civil servants have learned ‘best practices’ from each other. And indeed, 
we can see substantial institutional convergence towards a common model. All national 
parliaments have an EAC, the main function of which is to coordinate parliamentary 
scrutiny of the government in EU matters. To be sure, the exact roles and legal powers of 
these Committees do vary, but this should not hide the plain fact that the EACs perform 
broadly similar functions throughout the Union.3 The status of these EU committees 
does, however, seem to fluctuate significantly between the member states. For example, 
while Hegeland shows in his chapter that in the three Nordic countries the EAC is a fairly 
prestigious committee, according to Magone the situation is pretty much the opposite in 
the Mediterranean region.   
 
Secondly, specialized committees have gradually become more involved in processing 
EU matters. A higher share of national parliaments decentralizes scrutiny of European 
affairs downwards to these committees, with the goal of benefiting from the policy 
expertise of the MPs. Nonetheless, as several of the chapters in this volume testify, in 
many countries this involvement of the committees is more formal than real. For 
example, Hegeland discusses how the Danish and Swedish legislatures have repeatedly 
tried to make committees more active in European questions, but with limited success. 
Hence it appears that the only way to guarantee the regular and active involvement of 
specialized committees is to force them legally to both process and report on EU issues as 
happens in Finland. 
 
Third common feature is the limited role of EU matters in plenary debates. Here 
convergence is not explained by organizational choices, but mainly by the strategic 
interests of political parties. After all, there is no shortage of research confirming the 
disruptive impact of integration matters within parties.4 Expert surveys and public 
opinion data indicate that the parties are ideologically less cohesive on integration than in 
traditional left-right issues.5 Moreover, within parties the elected representatives are 
considerably more supportive of integration than their voters.6 Hence party leaders have 
an electoral incentive to marginalize EU issues and focus on socio-economic matters in 
order to avoid irritating their voters. Avoiding plenary debates on European integration 
should thus be seen as a logical response from political parties whose main goal is 
electoral success. The strategy of playing the EU card is risky business, and its success 
depends on the unity of the parties over European integration. 
 
Moreover, governments and the main parties in several EU countries continue to 
‘depoliticize’ the European issue through cross-party cooperation behind closed doors in 
the EAC with the aim of manufacturing consensus in national integration policy.7 Such 
consensus building has arguably been more pronounced in smaller member states, based 
on the logic that national unity and policy consistency increase their negotiating power in 
EU institutions.8 The chapter by Hegeland shows that this logic dominates proceedings in 
the Nordic countries – where European matters fall somewhere between domestic and 
foreign policy matters in terms of the openness of the decision-making procedures.9 
While the political elites may defend such consensus-building behind closed doors with 
the need to further national interests and to allow the confidential exchange of views 
between the government and the parliament, this mechanisms serves also the strategic 
interests of the parties. 
 
National parliaments have without any doubt learned how to play the European game 
better, with more active scrutiny of the government in EU matters the reality in basically 
all member states. However, the big question remains still largely unanswered – namely, 
to what extent do parliaments really influence government behaviour? And secondly, 
what level of parliamentary scrutiny in EU affairs can we realistically expect? Attempting 
to answer the first question is very difficult, as legislative scholars have always faced 
great difficulties in trying to measure or assess the parliament’s influence vis-à-vis the 
executive. The final section of this chapter will suggest ways of meeting this challenge. 
But the crucial point is the level of parliamentary scrutiny of EU affairs: can we expect 
tighter scrutiny or not? 
 Previous literature on explaining cross-national variation in the level of scrutiny of EU 
matters has shown that the variation is primarily explained by two factors: the role of the 
parliament in the domestic political system, and public and party opinion on European 
integration. According to the first variable, the executive-legislature relationship, the 
parliament controls the government to the same extent in European matters as it does in 
the context of domestic legislation (a kind of neofunctionalist "spill-over" effect). 
Similarly the contentiousness of salience of the European dimension is arguably 
important, with countries where integration matters produce divisions within parties and 
among the public adopting tighter scrutiny mechanisms. In a key contribution to the 
literature, and Saalfeld uses these factors to argue that the level of scrutiny we presently 
have – which by all accounts is not that impressive – is not very surprising and is in line 
with theoretical expectations. That is, national parliaments ‘delegate’ rather than 
‘abdicate’ EU matters to the governments10 -- in a similar way in which they delegate 
policy-making authority to governments and their agencies in electorally less salient 
matters. 
 
If we accept this basic line of reasoning, then we really have no reason to expect that 
national MPs would devote more of their time to EU matters in the future. In terms of 
election, focusing on European matters in parliamentary work is hardly an optimal 
strategy. EU policy may be important for the electoral districts (e.g., in terms of attracting 
regional policy funds), but not necessarily for the voters who still base their vote choices 
primarily on ‘domestic’ issues – taxation, health care, education, level of social services 
and so on.11 Secondly, as argued above, political parties are not very likely to push EU 
matters to the agenda of the plenaries. Hence the debating function of parliaments will 
remain unfulfilled in EU matters. And thirdly, even if the Constitutional Treaty was to 
enter into force, it would not mean any major transfers of power to the European level. 
Hence the policy reach of the Union, and the size of its budget, will stay more or less at 
the same level in the near future. This means that those issues that are salient in terms of 
voting behaviour in national elections will continue to be decided at the national level. In 
sum, these very basic considerations need to be taken into account when assessing the 
level of involvement by national MPs in European matters.        
       
The findings in this section have so far focused on the national level, but the 
contributions in this volume point also towards interesting developments concerning the 
collective role of national parliaments at the European level. The period from the early 
1990s to the start of the Convention saw a plethora of proposals about how to strengthen 
the status of national parliaments in the EU’s policy process. The majority of proposals 
advocating the establishment of a new collective organ of national MPs were made by 
British and French politicians, whose views largely represented a combination of 
Euroscepticism and the desire to safeguard the powers of national parliaments and 
thereby to inject democracy and legitimacy to European integration. According to most 
such proposals the organ of national MPs would either have been a non-legislative body, 
convening to debate the state of the Union, or it would have focused on monitoring 
compliance with the principle of subsidiarity and on discussing the distribution of powers 
between the EU and the member states. 
 But, as the chapter by Raunio shows, support for such proposals was always thin, with 
most member states against the creation of (yet another) institution that would have made 
the EU’s political system even more complicated. Also the proceedings of the Working 
Group on the role of national parliaments in the Convention illustrated well the lack of 
political will for further institutionalizing interparliamentary cooperation. The Working 
Group reached broad consensus on both sticking to present patterns of interparliamentary 
networking and on improving the capacity of individual national parliaments to control 
their governments in EU matters through giving better access to information. The new 
‘early warning system’ included in the Constitutional Treaty, where domestic parliaments 
have the opportunity to review the Commission’s legislative proposals and judge whether 
they are in compliance with the subsidiarity principle, will necessitate better exchange of 
information between national parliaments. This is likely to happen primarily through the 
Conference of European Affairs Committees (COSAC), the functions and powers of 
which are unlikely to change in the near future. Examining the value of COSAC, 
Bengtson argues that even in the context of its consultative role, national deputies seem 
to find the exchange of ideas and sharing of policy expertise worthwhile. And, as the 
country chapters on the ‘new’ member states show, the forum provided by COSAC was 
indeed highly useful when designing the parliamentary scrutiny systems for EU matters.    
 
The contributions in this volume and in previous publications indicate that there is much 
variation in the interest shown by national parliaments in forging links with European 
Parliament (EP) or involving Members of the European Parliament (MEP) in their 
work.12 While ties between the EP and the national legislatures have become more 
institutionalized and regular over the years13, there is little reason to expect that such 
contacts would intensify to any great extent in the foreseeable future. The calendars of 
both sets of parliamentarians are quite full, and hence finding time for such trips to 
Brussels is no easy task. Timetable problems are also one of the reasons why most 
national parliaments and their committees seldom invite MEPs to their meetings.14  
Moreover, while particularly bilateral meetings between the EP’s committees and their 
counterparts in domestic parliaments may facilitate the sharing of expertise, national MPs 
can arguably get similar information much more easily in their domestic settings. 
Especially MPs of the governing parties can always benefit from links with the executive 
branch, and both government and opposition parties can involve MEPs in the work of 
party organs. Indeed, national parties throughout the Union make now more active use of 
their MEPs, and these intra-party links are likely to remain the main channel for contacts 
between national parliaments and the EP.15         
 
To summarize, the findings of the volume reviewed in this section clearly point towards 
stronger involvement of national parliaments. This applies particularly to the national 
level, with most legislatures subjecting their governments to tighter scrutiny in EU 
matters than before. However, it is equally important to warn against too optimistic 
assessments of the strength of parliamentary scrutiny. European matters are simply not 
salient enough for most national deputies in order to facilitate a major qualitative leap in 
the level of control. Seen from the perspective of an average MP, engaging in EU issues 
is hardly very rewarding either in terms of re-election or of influencing public policy. 
Turning to the collective role, we can safely state that the current forms and level of 
interparliamentary cooperation are likely to prevail also in the future. Following the 
flurry of proposals concerning the collective organ of national MPs, and their subsequent 
rejection by the Convention and the national governments, we now have a much clearer 
picture of the limits and possibilities facing contacts between parliaments in modern 
Europe.     
 
Mapping out future challenges 
 
This concluding chapter has so far focused on analyzing past developments and current 
experiences in parliamentary scrutiny of EU matters. This final section looks ahead, 
mapping out some future challenges for both the parliaments themselves and for 
academic research. We shall first examine what the increasing use of OMC and other 
forms of intergovernmental policy coordination imply for national parliaments, and 
finally we turn our attention to reconsidering how national MPs can contribute more 
effectively to the EU’s policy process.   
 
The challenge posed by OMC deserves to be taken seriously.16 While intergovernmental 
policy coordination has been a feature of the EU’s decision-making system throughout 
the history of integration, such informal policy coordination has become much more 
prominent since the early 1990s. The European Employment Strategy (EES) adopted at 
the Essen European Council in 1994 and the coordination of national economic policies 
agreed in the Maastricht Treaty extended this coordination to two highly salient issue 
areas of domestic politics. And, the Open Method of Coordination became officially a 
part of EU jargon at the Lisbon European Council in 2000. OMC has four main 
components: 1) fixed guidelines set for the EU, with short-, medium-, and long-term 
goals; 2) quantitative and qualitative indicators and benchmarks; 3) European guidelines 
translated into national and regional policies and targets; and 4) periodic monitoring, 
evaluation and peer review, organized as a mutual learning process. In recent years OMC 
(together with other forms of policy coordination) has been applied to a broad range of 
policies, including employment, social policy, environment, taxation, immigration, 
research, transport, working time, social protection, education, social infrastructure, 
regional cohesion and social inclusion.  
 
The increasing use of OMC and other forms of informal, non-binding, primarily 
intergovernmental ‘soft law’ instruments needs to be understood in the context of the 
sensitive question of dividing competencies between the EU and its member states. 
European integration has reached the stage where the core areas of welfare state, such as 
social policy, employment, and education are starting to be affected. In these policy areas 
(that are both money-intensive and touch core areas of national sovereignty) it is very 
difficult to build the needed consensus among national governments for transferring 
policy-making authority to the European level - hence the resort to intergovernmental 
policy coordination. The national governments want, on the one hand, to achieve highly-
valued policy objectives, such as reducing unemployment and making their economies 
more competitive, while on the other hand, they are not willing to cede formal 
sovereignty to the Union. The Commission meanwhile sees these new modes of 
governance as a way to expand the EU’s competence in the face of resistance from the 
national governments. 
 
The literature on OMC and other forms of soft law instruments - or ‘new modes of 
governance’ - is already quite extensive.17 This literature has so far produced two main 
findings. First, it is still too early to make any definitive assessments of the success of 
OMC. Nevertheless, while the impact of OMC varies greatly between policy areas, 
scholars usually point that, unlike top-down supranational legislation, it is flexible and 
(supposedly) respects subsidiarity and national autonomy. The down-side of this 
flexibility and non-binding nature of outputs is that the EU has few if any means to make 
the national governments follow its recommendations. However, the more important 
findings in terms of national parliaments are those concerning the input of various 
‘stakeholders’ in the process. OMC has strengthened the leadership role of the Council 
and the European Council, intruding thus on the Commission’s right of monopoly. Yet, 
on the other hand, the Commission has a central role to play through its role as the 
institution setting objectives and issuing guidelines and recommendations to national 
governments.18 The EP is effectively sidelined, as it is merely kept informed or consulted 
of OMC processes. At the national level OMC seems to be the preserve of civil servants 
that possess expertise on the issues. 
 
At this point it is worth comparing the position of national parliaments in two modes of 
EU governance - the traditional ‘Community method’ of producing supranational 
legislation and the OMC mode.19 When it comes to agenda setting and proposal power, 
national parliaments are weak actors in both types of governance. In supranational 
legislation the Commission basically has the monopoly of initiative, but obviously its 
initiatives are largely based on instructions from the Council and the European Council. 
The OMC is much more a tool to be used collectively by the member states, but here too 
the EU institutions – mainly the Commission and the Council depending on the policy 
question – set the agenda and coordinate subsequent actions. In supranational legislation 
the formal competence belongs to the EU, whereas the OMC is primarily used in policy 
areas where the Union has no access to binding legislation. This division of competence 
impacts also on the Council decision rule. Most supranational legislation is passed 
nowadays in the Council by qualified majority voting (QMV), but in OMC processes 
issues are decided by unanimity. Thus domestic legislatures are in a stronger position, as 
national governments cannot be outvoted in the Council, and hence national parliaments 
can, at least theoretically, veto decisions they disagree with.20  
 
Turning to the domestic level, civil servants are central actors in both types of 
governance. However, in the OMC their role appears to have been far more influential, 
with much less guidance and instructions from members of government. As the chapters 
in this volume show, most national legislatures have become more actively involved in 
EU issues in recent years. The (so far relatively scarce) evidence from the OMC, in turn, 
shows that national parliaments have not scrutinized OMC documents in the same way as 
they process EU laws (see below). The formal information rights of national parliaments 
are also stronger in supranational legislation, as they receive the legislative initiatives 
from their own government and also from the Commission. As OMC documents are non-
legislative items, the information rights of national legislatures are generally weaker. 
Importantly, if the government is not obliged to send the documents to the parliaments, 
then it is up to the national MPs to ask for such documents (provided they are aware of 
their existence).  
 
The role of the parliamentary opposition is quite different in the two types of governance. 
In supranational legislation the opposition of course attacks the government, but this 
criticism is modified by two factors. First, as discussed by Hegeland in the chapter on the 
Nordic EU countries, national integration policy is often based on broad parliamentary 
consensus, with the opposition also involved in forming national positions. Moreover, 
were the opposition to attack the government, the prime minister might blame the 
opposition parties for rocking the boat and jeopardizing the success of the government 
(and thereby the ‘national interest’) in EU negotiations.21 But in the OMC the opposition 
can use the information generated by cross-national comparisons to criticize the 
government for inefficiency and policy failures.      
 
This brief comparison reveals that national parliaments could in fact in many ways 
benefit from the use of OMC, not least because it does not force the domestic legislatures 
to adopt legislation. However, the available evidence indicates that national parliaments 
have failed to make an impact in OMC. Examining policy coordination in employment 
and social inclusion strategies, the country chapters in the volume edited by Zeitlin et al. 
testify that the various OMC documents, particularly National Action Plans (NAP), 
largely escaped parliamentary scrutiny or debates.22 To be sure, parliaments were often 
informed about NAPs, but mainly after they had already been produced and sent off to 
Brussels. In some exceptional cases national MPs did demand more information, and 
there were also some examples of opposition parties using EU’s recommendations to 
support their own claims.23 Examining also employment and pensions policies, de la 
Porte and Nanz note that these processes escaped parliamentary scrutiny.24 National 
legislators thus have very little direct involvement in the OMC, playing at best a passive 
role by being informed of developments.25 While there are no other comparative studies 
examining the contribution of NPs, it is noteworthy that domestic legislatures are hardly 
even mentioned in other publications on the OMC.  
 
There are arguably three main reasons why national parliaments have failed to make an 
impact under OMC. First, the whole process is by its very nature intergovernmental, with 
civil servants primarily responsible for drafting national programmes and presenting them 
in Brussels.26 National MPs are informed of these preparations, but far too often this 
happens much too late. Secondly, national MPs may find it hard to follow OMC 
processes. Unlike normal EU legislation, OMC and other forms of policy coordination do 
not often have any fixed deadlines or even rules guiding the behaviour of the various 
actors. Given the intergovernmental or informal nature of OMC, there is also (at least in 
some national parliaments) procedural ambiguity about how to process these things in 
parliament and domestically in general. Hence it might be that national parliaments have 
simply not learned yet how to contribute to OMC issues and that their contribution will 
become stronger over time. And thirdly, it appears that the actual impact of OMC and 
other forms of informal policy coordination has so far been relatively modest, if not even 
inconsequential, in many policy areas. As a result, national parliamentarians have not 
found it worthwhile to spend their precious time on scrutinizing such processes.         
 
Despite the relatively limited policy impact of OMC, its extended application means that 
national parliaments can not simply ignore such processes. Here it is important to 
emphasize the difference between OMC and supranational legislation. The negotiations 
that form part of OMC are always carried out behind closed doors, and the legal rules 
about information rights that apply to access to legislative documents do not cover non-
legislative items. The processing of supranational legislation is on the whole much more 
transparent, particularly under co-decision procedure where the EP is actively involved, 
and, overall, national parliaments find it easier to follow the adoption of EU laws because 
such procedures are subject to clearer timetables and inter-institutional rules. As a result, 
OMC and intergovernmental policy coordination thus weakens the transparency of 
collective decision making and, consequently, the accountability of the representatives. 
To facilitate parliamentary involvement in OMC, such matters should be processed by 
national parliaments using the same procedure that is reserved for scrutinizing the 
Commission’s legislative initiatives. This would mean that ministers would be forced to 
explain their actions before parliamentary committees and perhaps even in the plenary, 
with MPs having the chance to put questions to the ministers or other government 
representatives travelling to Brussels.27 While MPs and parliamentary civil servants may 
object to this by saying that their desks are already full without having to process such 
non-binding matters, one must keep in mind that policy coordination is to an increasing 
extent used in questions that are highly salient for most MPs, including such issues as 
employment policy, economic policy, social policy and pension reforms. Efficient 
scrutiny of such matters is thus significant also in terms of national legislation, as the 
policy choices adopted at the European level increasingly impact on member states’ 
domestic politics.28  
 
The challenge posed by OMC is directly linked to the agenda for future research on 
national parliaments. The overwhelming majority of both comparative projects and case 
studies on parliamentary scrutiny of EU matters have focused primarily on institutional 
adaptation by domestic legislatures. As a result, we now have a good understanding of 
how national parliaments process European affairs, and what are the main difficulties 
facing national MPs in attempting to control the executive in EU issues. These studies on 
organisational arrangements and legal rules provide a solid framework for deepening 
research to behaviour. Future research should thus establish a link between institutional 
choices and behaviour, examining whether procedural choices that work on paper also 
produce effective scrutiny in practice. Only through in-depth empirical analyses can we 
answer whether or to what extent national parliaments can really influence government 
behaviour. One way to conduct such research would be to compare scrutiny in the two 
modes of EU governance outlined above, with the sample containing both supranational 
laws and matters falling in the domain of OMC or other forms of intergovernmental 
coordination. Examples of the latter are coordination of national policies in the 
framework of Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and in the context of 
meeting the objectives of the Lisbon strategy. Future research should also make better use 
of theoretical insights from literature on political parties. After all, the deputies 
controlling the government are party politicians. Whether a party is in opposition or in 
government and the level of party cohesion over Europe are bound to impact on the 
strategies national MPs employ to control the executive and to get involved in European 
matters.29      
 
In his chapter on accountability, MacCarthaigh discussed the various problems that 
parliaments face in controlling the executive branch. European integration is just one of 
the external factors that contribute to deparliamentarization, and hence another useful 
concept for future research would be to analyse the effects of European integration on 
national legislatures as part of a broader set of contextual variables setting constraints on 
what MPs can do. Here insights from the multi-level governance (MLG) framework 
could be employed to get a fuller picture of both the institutional and policy constraints 
facing national parliaments. The MLG framework could also by of help in assessing the 
role of regional legislatures in the EU’s policy process. While the EU currently includes 
only three countries – Austria, Belgium, Germany -- that are formally categorized as 
federal, countries throughout the Union have decentralized powers to the regions and 
local governments during the past decades.30 These decentralization reforms have gone 
hand in hand with simultaneous transfers of powers to the European level, and hence the 
EU impacts also significantly on the work of regional legislative bodies.31     
     
Finally, regardless of how effective national parliaments are in controlling their 
governments in EU matters, they seem to enter the game practically always only after the 
Commission has published an initiative. As a result, domestic legislatures are always 
reacting to developments at the European level. Perhaps national MPs should reconsider 
their strategies. Is it really an optimal solution in terms of policy influence to focus 
scrutiny on individual pieces of EU legislation? One solution would be to be more 
selective in deciding which legislative initiatives deserve detailed scrutiny, and to 
complement this reactive scrutiny with proactive European work. A good example is the 
work done by the House of Lords. As Cygan shows in his chapter, the reports produced 
by the Lords on European matters are widely praised and have even managed to exert 
some policy influence in Brussels. Maybe other national parliaments could follow this 
route, and draft similar reports on questions are that salient for their countries. This would 
enable national MPs to send political messages to the European level before the policy 
process begins in the EU’s institutions.     
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